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Soon after his coup in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf reassured the 
Pakistani people that his was not an obscurantist religious agenda. Instead, he referred to 
the Ata Turk model as his inspiration in his mission to rescue Pakistanis from corrupt 
democratic governments that had dominated the 1990s. A photo release of him holding 
two Pekinese dogs in his arms (commonly considered na-paak or unclean by Muslims) 
and surrounded by his short-haired wife, elderly mother and artist daughter, earned him a 
seal of approval from progressive upper-classes at home and the international community 
at large. Unlike the previous dictator, Gen Zia ul Haq, who carried out the oppressive and 
misogynist Islamisation project between 1977-88, this new-age military ruler seemed to 
espouse modern, ‘secular’ and liberal credentials. Thereafter began an era that has been 
dominated by several sociological changes in the country. In this article, three underlying 
concepts will be explored in relation to these changes and their impact on women. These 
include a critique of the romanticisation of the agency of women members belonging to 
the religio-political party in government; the strategic shifts in ideological positioning 
within the women’s movement; and the impact of the debate over religion and secularism 
in relation to women’s political reality. This essay discusses the interplay of the 
understandings and contradictions of Islamic and secular identity politics in the Pakistani 
women’s movement. The methodology incorporates a reading of existing scholarship as 
well as observation of feminist activism in the political context of Pakistan. 
 
Keywords: Islamist agency, secular feminism, Pakistani women’s movement  
 
 Enlightened Moderation 
As a liberal dictator, one of the things Gen. Musharraf will undoubtedly be 
remembered for is the promotion of women’s causes during his nine year rule as 
President of Pakistan (1999-2008). He will also be remembered for his infamous 
accusation of rape survivor, Mukhtaran Mai, as a case in point that women cry ‘rape’ 
every time they want to gain visa/asylum to Canada
2
. Under his leadership, women 
gained unprecedented rights in terms of political representation in Parliament; 
appointments in the federal cabinet; appointments in the armed forces and in public 
services, as well as patronage in the arts and cultural expression. Most importantly, we 
saw the reform of the discriminatory Zina Ordinance
3
 against which the women’s 
movement
4
 had pitted a long-term struggle. 
                                                 
1
 Afiya S Zia is a feminist activist based in Pakistan. She is the author of ‘Sex Crime in the Islamic Context; 
Rape, Class and Gender in Pakistan’. She lectures in Sociology, works in the development sector and has 
edited a series of books on women’s issues. Her current research focuses on the challenges to secular 
feminism in Pakistan as the women’s movement confronts growing conservatism and Islamic militancy. In 




 These laws were passed in 1979 as part of Gen Zia ul Haq’s Islamisation policy. The Zina Ordinance 
made adultery a crime against the state punishable by death and blurred the line between rape and 
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or  
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At the same time, it was during these years that women increasingly started 
observing the hejab, a form of scarving or veil not widely practised in Pakistan before; 
piety movements gained momentum such that women preachers now had large 
followings and even set up private faith-based institutions and schools. For the first time 
in Pakistan, the Islamist parties won substantive seats in Parliament. Most importantly, 
we saw a split in the women’s movement after 25 years, when the right wing women’s 
movement withdrew from the consensus that the discriminatory Zina Ordinance 
contravened the Quranic understanding of adultery. Instead, the right wing women 
reversed their long-standing support from the campaign to repeal this law. They actively 
organised protests and opposed, in Parliament, the efforts of the progressives to repeal or 
reform the controversial Zina laws.
5
 
These contradictions and tensions make this period one of the most interesting 
and challenging for the women’s movement. General Musharraf’s very first speech 
assured the Pakistani people that his was not an obscurantist religious agenda. The 
reference was obvious – a distancing from the last military dictatorship of Gen Zia ul Haq 
(1977-88) whose Islamisation agenda targeted women and minorities and 
institutionalised legal and social discrimination. Zia’s regime had also instilled a spirit of 
militancy in the army, as well as strengthened the cause of bigoted religious politics in 
the country. The liberals were relieved to not have another faith-based moral crusader in 
uniform. 
The Enlightened Moderation theme of Gen. Musharraf’s rule become the raison 
d’etre for manoeuvring his continuation at the helm of state affairs rather than calling for 
elections and reverting to total civilian governance. The reason there was no concerted 
serious protest movement against this was, that liberals perceived him as a potential 
bulwark against the conservative ambitions of the previous government.
6
 Unlike previous 
leaders, there was also a broad consensus that Gen. Musharraf was personally and 
materially incorruptible. The religious parties saw this as an opportunity to take 
advantage of swing votes, given the absence of leadership for the two leading parties, the 
liberal Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the conservative Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML). They also had the very recent 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror as 





                                                                                                                                                 
consensual intercourse. Many hundreds of women have been victimised and jailed under this law. It has 
since been amended in 2006 under the Protection of Women Act. 
4
 In this essay, I refer to the women’s movement through a more inclusive definition which recognises 
women activists across the board regardless of their ideological location on the political spectrum. In 
general, the activists with a consciously feminist orientation and involved in human rights based work are 
referred to (by the media, analysts, and in development literature) as ‘progressives’ and ‘liberals’ while the 
more right wing women activists, usually associated with religious political parties, are perceived as 
‘radical’ and ‘conservative’. Gen Musharraf and his supporters positioned his rule as a ‘moderate’ wedge 
between these two ends of the political spectrum.  
5
 Some of these debates are recorded in ‘A Five Year Report on Performance of Women Parliamentarians 
in the 12
th
 National Assembly (2002-2007)’, Naeem Mirza and Wasim Wagha, Aurat Foundation 
Publication, 2009. 
6
 This was the Pakistan Muslim League government under Nawaz Sharif, (1996-99). 
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Democratic Opportunity for Islamists, Women and Islamist Women 
Fresh elections to legitimise the military take over also provided an opportunity to 
the previously unsuccessful religious political parties to gain electoral success in 2002. In 
the four previous elections of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996, these parties never gained 
more than 3% of Parliamentary seats. This did not mean they did not exert influence on 
mainstream politics despite their lack of electoral strength. However, the atrophying of 
the main political parties, the PPP and the PML, was achieved when the leaders of both 
main parties went into exile after Gen. Musharraf’s coup of 1999. This was to avoid the 
backlash expected from the military government’s “accountability” process initiated soon 
after the 1999 coup. In 2001, the Mutahida Majlis e Amal (MMA-United Council for 
Action), was founded by the then amir
7
 of the Jamaat e Islami,
8
 Qazi Hussein Ahmed, 
who invited an alliance of six religious political parties. The MMA contested the 
elections called by General Musharraf to restore ‘controlled’ democracy under his 
leadership.  
The trajectory of Islamist politics in the country is not the central concern of this 
essay. However, the political context is important when we consider the social backlash 
that resulted when, for the first time an Islamist alliance party gained substantial 
governmental power and was democratically instituted in Pakistan through the ballot box. 
The attendant alteration in the cultural landscape under the MMA has adversely affected 
Pakistan’s political stability, politicised further the role of religion and has severely 
impacted women in particular. 
Gen. Musharraf’s “Enlightened Moderation” project was not just dismissed as a 
delayed political justification for his subversion of democratic governance in Pakistan, it 
was also mocked by analysts, commentators and even in popular cultural expression. 
Even the right wing political party leaders understood this afterthought, as a political 
posturing by (now) President Gen. Musharraf
9
, which he appropriated so that he may 
appear to western powers as the only liberal alternative to extremist threat after 9/11. 
The right wing parties had always suspected the General as liberal in his 
disposition (just like the liberals hung onto this as a positive attribute, even if he was a 
military man) but they were never threatened by it. The only ones who seemed to take the 
enlightened moderation proposal seriously were the diasporic revivalists
10
 who 
                                                 
7
 Religious mentor/ leader 
8
 The Jamaat e Islami was a reformist movement for Indian Muslims formed in 1941 which later went on to 
become a right wing Islamic political party in Pakistan. Its mass base includes an educated middle class and 
despite its ideologue for a gradual Islamisation, the party never did well in any national election. For the 
2002 elections, they allied with 5 other religio-political parties to form the MMA and subsequently, formed 
part of the government.  
9
 Prior to his election as President through a controversial referendum in April 2002, Gen. Musharraf 
appointed himself as Chief Executive of Pakistan. In 2000, the Supreme Court delivered a judgement that 
justified the military takeover under the ‘doctrine of necessity’ and gave Musharraf a three year period to 
hold General Elections and restore democracy (Zafar Ali Shah Vs Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of 
Pakistan (PLD 2000 S.C 869). 
10
 Those involved in excavating an Islamic cultural relevance for Muslim societies as an alternate social 
order in place of post-colonial modernity. This scholarship and political mobilisation has gained 
momentum in the Islamophobic environment in western countries after 9/11. With reference to the 
women’s movement, some of these scholars moved from their initial criticism of Islamisation projects in 
Muslim majority countries and now support women’s rights within the Islamic discourse. These scholars 
define themselves as ‘Islamic Feminists’, however, not all within this movement support or call for a 
  Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009 228 
considered this as a purported aim of Gen. Musharraf to impose a modernist, secular and 
by his own inspired claim, an “Ataturk model of modernity” onto Pakistan. As seen in the 
political events that unfolded after 2002, this was a seriously miscalculated evaluation.   
Women’s organisations had for years been advocating for affirmative action to 
facilitate women’s political representation in political foray and this seemed like a pipe-
dream. Even under the liberal government of the late Benazir Bhutto, women’s 
representation in Parliament was at a mere 1.4% and her party pleaded lack of political 
support from the Opposition to increase this quota. 
However, the Legal Framework Order (2002)
11
 under Gen. Musharraf made 
Constitutional changes that increased the number of overall seats in the legislature and 
increased the quota for reserved seats for women substantially. Apart from the (12) 
directly elected women, an unprecedented 60 seats for women were reserved for the 2002 
elections. Women’s organisations worked dynamically with women candidates to 
campaign for these seats. The MMA won an overall 51 seats in the National Assembly of 
which 12 had to be filled by its women members. 
Although strongly opposed to a woman as head of an Islamic state and complicit 
in preventing women from contesting for public office and even from exercising their 
right to vote, the MMA women readily accepted seats that were fielded by them on behalf 
of their male relatives. There is no better example of politics by proxy than this. Although 
traditionally, women representatives from other political parties do not fare any better 
and also tend to operate as male proxies, yet the religious political parties make no 
apology for this trend. Theirs is a clear agenda – take any opportunity, including those 
attributed as progressive, modernist means, only to subvert them towards conservative 
ends. Thus, despite opposing the quota accorded to women on principle, the MMA 
women representatives actively participated in the legislative process between 2002 and 
2007. One MMA Parliamentarian is reported to have said that women should have 
separate, segregated assemblies to debate their issues and that MMA would avail of the 
reserved seats only to ensure repeal of this provision once they had built the political 
power base that would enable them to do so.
12
 
The record of the MMA provincial government formed in the North Western 
Frontier Province (NWFP, neighbouring with Afghanistan), is a bleak trajectory that 
signals the political slide into uber conservatism as exemplified in the Hisba 
(Accountability) Act. This law originally proposed by the MMA in NWFP in 2003, in 
violation of the Constitution, essentially attempted to legalise gender apartheid by 
awarding the Mohtasib (Arbiter) the duty to protect Islamic values and etiquette and act 
as vigilante. Under his watch, a culture police was to be appointed for the ‘Promotion of 
Virtue and Prevention of Vice’ to monitor the social and personal relationships and 
activities of citizens. It was passed by the NWFP legislative assembly on the second 
attempt but on a reference by Gen. Musharraf, was disallowed by the Supreme Court as 
contravention of the Constitution, in 2006.  
                                                                                                                                                 
theocratic state. At the same time, some of these revivalist academics do not support or uphold feminist 
values either. In this essay, I recognise this distinction between Islamic Feminists and Revivalists with 
reference to women’s issues. 
11
 Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002 indemnified Gen Musharraf’s coup and gave him an extension of 
five years as President among other constitutional changes. 
12
 Quoted in Nazish Brohi, ‘The MMA Offensive; Three years in power 2003-2005’, Monograph by Action 
Aid, Pakistan, 2006, pg. 58. 
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Just like liberal and nationalist agendas are constructed across the body politic of 
women, the religious right too derives its moral authority from womanhood as a signifier 
of its ideological commitment to preserve male-defined, religiously ordained social order. 
Thus the MMA rule in NWFP based itself on a moral imperative to provide social order 
through vigilantism and remove all visible markers of womanhood from the public and 
relegate it to the private realm.  
During the Musharraf years (1999-2008) on the one hand, we saw women being 
consciously inducted in public services, such as the first woman state bank governor, 
official female guards of Jinnah’s
13
 mausoleum, airline pilots, as coast guards and in the 
armed forces and senior positions in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, in the NWFP, a 
systematic drive was launched to remove any signs of womanhood in the public sphere. 
For example, women’s shelters were attacked as western inspired initiatives that 
encouraged adultery and obscenity. In fact, a full fledged anti-obscenity campaign was 
conducted by the youth wing of the MMA whereby billboards and hoardings of women 
in advertisements were blackened with paint and torn down. The most symbolic act was 
the order by the provincial government that all mannequins must be removed from shops 
as they represented the (disembodied) female form in public. All forms of femaleness 
must be relegated to the private, domestic realm of the family. Women leaders and 
activists of the religious parties were at the forefront and complicit in such campaigns as 




These contradictions in the self-acclaimed liberal dispensation of General 
Musharraf’s government peaked under his rule which had accommodated Islamist 
politics for political expediency. Although this is not untrue of previous dictatorships in 
Pakistan, the result this time, however, has influenced unprecedented social upheaval and 
an academic conflation of notions of what is liberal, secular, modern or traditional. This 
period split the liberals and conservatives alike. In principle, liberals were supporting a 
military dictator who wasn’t quite dictatorial, yet he had accommodated the religio-
political parties who instituted the most radical conservative drives in the NWFP. At the 
same time, Gen. Musharraf played the buffer in resisting their attempt to impose 
religiousity over state and cultural discourse. 
The liberal/conservative or modernist/traditional divide worked in synch and 
harmony since it did not directly challenge the interests of the liberal elite, who in turn 
supported a (politically conservative) military under a liberal leader. The military in turn 
was receiving moral and financial support for its frontline role in the war on terror and 
thus (ostensibly) breaking from its traditional support of jihadi militants.
15
 The 
                                                 
13
 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, (1876-1948) first Governor General and the Quaid or founder of Pakistan. 
14
 Afiya Shehrbano, The Invisible Woman, The News, Karachi, April 21, 2005, http://thenews.com.pk 
15
 Ahmed Rashid describes jihadi militants in Afghanistan as those who wage militancy so as to impose a 
new Islamic order by adopting the shariah or Islamic order not for the purpose of pursuing justice or any 
social benefits but as a means to regulate personal behaviour and a regime that sustains itself through 
punitive rule. Rashid describes this as a perversion of the original meaning of jihad which during Prophet 
Muhammad’s time was understood as the struggle to improve the self and/or transform a corrupt society. 
The Pakistani secret service, military and intelligence agencies invoke the notion of jihad as a holy war and 
use this as a training ethos and have historically relied on it as a metaphor for the struggle for the liberation 
of Indian-held Kashmir and against the communist occupation of Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Jihad; The 
Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia’, Penguin 2003, England. 
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conservative religious parties who opposed this role as America’s ally, still stayed in 
government to gain credibility as a legitimate democratic entity. Through provincial 
governance they actively radicalised the socio-cultural political environment by wedding 
religious codes with and by, furthering cultural conservatism.  
However, my interest in exploring these contradictions is not speculative. Rather, 
I am interested to look through the lens of the women’s movement to assess how these 
developments have reflected and impacted the strategic positions and the identity politics 
within the Pakistani women’s movement itself. In other words, the inherent 
contradictions within the progressive women’s movement of the 1980s onwards, with 
regard to its strategic relationship with religion, is a mirror reflection of the interplay of 
overall religious and secular identity politics played out from 2002 to 2008. This has left 
the women’s movement more polarised on the issue of whether it is still possible to 
reclaim the potential of religion to lobby for women’s rights in the Muslim context or, if 
the only choice is now to remain wary of the religious idiom and stick to secular 
credentials and base its demands on a universal human rights discourse.
16
   
 
Faith-based Feminisms 
The first generation of Islamic modernist feminists
17
 believed in the participatory 
nature of religion, as well as the ‘psychological healing’ and the ‘solace and solidarity’
18
 
it may provide in the absence of alternatives, particularly for women from lower classes. 
This attribution of women’s religious expressions as a placation or compensation for their 
social class is also not new. Linked to the critique of the urban-based, bourgeois   
women’s movement has been the suggestion that one reason for the failure of mass 
mobilisation of women across classes, was because they chose to posit their politics 
outside of the religious framework.  
Contemporary new scholarship challenges this limited attribution. Revivalist 
literature by academics studying contemporary Islamic movements, advocate the viability 
of re-instituting alternative Islamic economic, legal and political systems. They do not 
consider such projects to be simply reactions to Western colonialism and imperialism. 
With regard to the study of women activists of such Islamic political movements in 
Pakistan, this literature challenges the notion that right wing women are pressurised to 
join Islamic political parties. It also challenges the idea that Islam/an Islamic state is 
                                                 
16
 The emergence of all these identity conflicts cannot be read in an historical vacuum. Many of the socio-
political crises came to a head during this period but were in continuation of growing violence and 
conservatism that pre-date 9/11. The contention here is that during the Musharraf regime, the conservative 
elements and faith based religious parties sought to expand their brand with renewed zeal in the wake of 
9/11 and in an effort to reclaim and articulate all symbols and policies based purely on an imagined Islamic 
identity.  
17
 Feminists concerned with empowerment of their gender within a ‘rethought Islam’ and are involved in 
reinterpreting and re-examining a masculinist reading of the Quran (divine Holy Book of Muslims) and 
Shariah (Islamic law derived from the Quran and compiled sayings of the Prophet of Islam, Prophet 
Muhammad. Riffat Hasan and Asma Barlas are well-known academics residing in the USA who fall in this 
category. In Pakistan, Islamic feminist scholarship is most often associated with Farida Shaheed heading 
the NGO, Shirkat Gah and is a south asian contact for the Women Living Under Muslim Laws network.  
18
 Farida Shaheed, “Women’s Experiences of Identity, Religion and Activism in Pakistan”’ in ‘The Post-
Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan’, S.M.Naseem and Khalid Nadvi (Eds), 
Oxford University Press, 2002, pg 367. 
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oppressive for women as defined by orientalist literature or that women’s resistance, 
agency and autonomy must be the opposite of subordination.
19
  
The Islamic feminists of the 1980s in Pakistan wished to sieve out the patriarchy 
from a male-defined Islam and saw religion as a pawn abused by an oppressive state. 
Their project became to reclaim feminist possibilities within a reformed Islam and they 
were well supported by sympathetic international donors for such efforts. However, this 
strategy, despite some acclaim by Iranian Islamic feminists, has been criticised for paying 
a price whereby the feminism part of Islamic feminism gets subsumed and relegated as a 
lesser appendage to the more compelling and overarching Islamic phenomena. Islam as a 
political strategy is increasingly becoming a limited empowering tool for the Islamic 
feminist reformist project – instead it has become a legitimate mobilising strategy almost 
exclusively for the radical right.
20
 
The Islamic feminists clearly discredited the patriarchal Islamist project that 
aimed to inscribe religion onto the state and convert it from a secular entity into a sacred 
one.
21
 The more recent scholarship from revivalists argues exactly the same but opposes 
the end analysis. Humeira Iqtidar suggests that yes, Islamists wish to inscribe religion 
onto the state but by virtue of this imposition, will be converting the sacred (agenda of 
religiousity) into a secular entity (state politics), rather than the other way around.
22
 She 
upholds that since all secular states are essentially premised on religious faith, why can 
Islamic politics not be an equal contender for the secular label? What she doesn’t specify 
is a repeated question asked by Pakistani secularists – what kind of a state does this 
project envision? What laws, economy and processes will it be governed by and what 
would the citizenship of women and minorities be based upon? In other words, what is 
the political or indeed, economic relevance of this proposition?  
Meanwhile, various western governments propelled by their own political 
compulsions, seek to fund such introspection, research and development by looking for 
alternative expressions of a ‘soft’ Islam in Muslim countries. This is pandering to and 
resulting in apologia literature and diluted political insight into the dynamics of 
fundamentalist strategies. Worst of all, it is premised on essentialist notions that in 
                                                 
19
 With reference to women and Pakistan this literature includes my readings of Humeira Iqtidar, The 
Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, UK, 2008, 
Faiza Mushtaq, ‘Al-Huda: New Forms of Islamic Education’ (paper presented at the ‘Miskeen’ study group 
in Karachi). Others would include Sadaf Aziz, ‘Beyond Petition and Redress: Mixed Legality and Consent 
in Marriage for Women in Pakistan’ and Moeen Cheema and Abdul Rahman, ‘From Hudood Ordinances to 
the Women’s Protection Act, papers presented at the 3rd Social Sciences Annual Conference at the Lahore 
University of Management Sciences, December 2007, which look to tackle the woman question from a new 
perspective located entirely within Islamic jurisprudence.  Amina Jamal’s work and doctoral thesis, 
similarly, explores the potential of a ‘balanced modernity’ amongst right wing women activists inspired by 
modern Islamic revivalism (see bibliography for a list of her work). 
20
 For detailed critique on Islamic feminism in Pakistan, see Afiya S Zia, ‘The Reinvention of Feminism in 
Pakistan’, Feminist Review, Issue 91, South Asian Feminisms; Negotiating New Terrains, Editors, Firdous 
Azim, Nivedita Menon and Dina M Siddiqi, Palgrave Macmillan, London, UK, 2009. 
21
 Farida Shaheed, Gender, Religion and the Quest for Justice in Pakistan, Report for United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) & Heinrich Boll Stiftung project on Religion, 
Politics and Gender Equality, Geneva, 2009, pg 37. 
22
 Humeira Iqtidar, The Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Cambridge, UK, 2008, pg 163.  
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Muslim majority countries, it is the religious identities that are foremost considerations 
when analysing socio-political behaviour. 
The Islamic Revivalist movement globally is usually dated to the 1970s and refers 
to a resurgent ethos, sensibility and even academic interest in Islam in contemporary 
Muslim societies. Such a movement includes the women’s mosque or piety movements 
which often began informally and sometimes were linked to social welfare and only later 
became more organised and structured. Some contemporary revivalist Pakistani 
scholars
23
 quote revivalist literature stating that since there is no formal church or clergy 
in Islam, thereby there is no possibility of calling for a separation of state and religion, or 
for secularisation. The suggestion is that Islam is, by this definition, already secular. 
However, to the extent that there is de facto state power held by many a clergy in 
Muslim-majority states, or who hold the state hostage through competing religious 
idioms, this automatic secular theory is a myth. 
In any case, the larger point is that dismantling the structures of political Islam 
will not challenge the increasing privatisation of religion in Pakistan.
24
 This private realm 
is the point of entry for faith-based activism and intervention and the point where 
Islamists are most successful. This private realm has become the site where both Islamic 
feminists and revivalists base their analysis and hope for potentially liberating faith based 
politics, particularly for women. Their differences come about in the understanding of 
politics.  
While Islamic feminists consider religion a private spiritual, cultural and social 
vehicle of empowerment, the revivalists invite the political expression of belief as a 
legitimate mode of women’s agency and liberation. They also differ on the nature and 
role of the state but revivalist women, beyond their rejection of western universalism, 
secular laws and modernity as a colonial imposition, have not outlined their vision as 
clearly. Some works-in-progress advocate the need for Islamic jurisprudence and 
authentic structures such as Qazi courts to replace the post-colonial judicial systems in 
Islamic republics such as Pakistan.
25
 However, these are already the demands of some 
Islamist parties and even the Taliban, in Pakistan. Thus such demands from these 
scholars and academics (mostly western educated themselves) overlap within the realm 
of conservative politics. Also, such demands are deeply contested amongst Islamic 
scholars, including those within Pakistan. 
Having said that, since Islamic feminists in Pakistan are clear about their demand 
for a secular or non-theocratic state, their demand for the repeal of Islamic laws and 
separation of religion from state business is a consistent one. By this token they can also 
continue to simultaneously work on feminising women’s relationship with religion within 
the private or social sector. However, revivalists challenge this demarcation by 
illustrating the lived realities of women involved in piety and faith-based movements and 
                                                 
23
 See note 18 
24
 By privatisation of religion I do not imply that religious expression has therefore dissipated from the 
public. Instead, social conservatism has increased precisely because personal expressions of religion are 
influencing public articulations to the exclusion of other forms of sociability. This includes language, dress, 
and a general conflation of Islam with everything that is to do with ‘Arab-ized’ culture as a conscious effort 
to counter south asian (Indian) influences.   
25
 Discussion at a seminar, The 3rd Social Sciences Annual Conference at the Lahore University of 
Management Sciences,  December 2007, Lahore, Pakistan. Qazi courts would be presided by Islamist 
jurists or ‘qazis’. Currently, Pakistan’s judiciary runs on a secular model inherited from colonial India.  
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insist this should be seen as political and a valid instrument of empowerment, 
mobilisation and expression of women’s attempts to cross the private/public divide. 
It is important to point out the lack of debate and discussion within or indeed, 
between the various factions of the women’s movement in Pakistan. Even the upper-class, 
urban- based, academic feminists tend to dismiss challenges, critiques or even dialogue 
with dissenters or conservative elements, as a waste of time because there are so many 
‘real issues’ or (usually, donor funded) projects to get on with. This paper does not 
suggest that the shift in ideologies within the women’s movements in Pakistan have come 
about through any conscious debate or consensus. Rather, this paper argues that 
competing theories on the role of religion in relation to women are shifting due to 
academic interests on the subject rather than out of a political engagement. The central 
argument in this paper challenges the temptation within this scholarship to promote the 
practices and activism of the right-wing women as indicative of a newly founded 
liberationist alternative to western feminism and universal rights.   
 
Contesting for Primacy in the Private Realm  
On one level, Pakistani feminists have been concerned with disentangling the 
state policy of Gen. Zia that attempted to limit women to the chador and chaardevari
26
 
which relegated women’s primary roles as domestic. At the same time, some feminists 
equally recognise, emphasise and value the private spaces and sanctuaries that women 





 are assessed as empowering strategies in an environment where they lack 
democratic or domestic relevance.  
Hence, today the challenge is not simply from an overtly theocratic state that is 
pushing an Islamist agenda but fragmented, organised faith-based (almost always gender-
segregated) interest groups. They compete for legitimacy in routine politics and for 
relevance in the social fabric of the country. This growing piety movement includes many 
women religious leaders and home-based preachers, several of whom have successfully 
activated networks and mobilised communities to spread their word. Often, though not 
always, the women’s theology groups are purported for the cause of women’s rights in 
Islam. What used to be the strategies and vocabulary of the liberal and upper class non-
governmental organisations’ (NGO) women activists, have been claimed by these 
supposedly more ‘indigenous’ Islamic women’s rights activists.
29
 These Islamist women 
may not be overtly politicised as yet but certainly are involved in (what is commonly 
known in NGO vocabulary as) ‘advocacy’ towards this end. 
Amina Jamal’s (2005) work on Jamaat e Islami
30
 (JI) women’s political activism 
argues that the secular women’s movement in Pakistan has refused to recognise the 
Jamaat women’s agency and only see this in terms of a passive submission to Jamaat men.
 
Jamal warns of the danger of denying the autonomy and emancipatory self-definition of 
Jamaat women. Jamal suggests this denial allows some (secular) feminists to re-present 
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the right wing women as victims of false consciousness so that they may construct their 
own identities as feminists with a modernist agenda, particularly against Islamisation.
31
 
In contrast, Jamal’s own work attempts to highlight the effectiveness of Jamaat women’s 
autonomous attempts to appropriate modernity towards their own ends and their 
understanding of rights. These modern social and political rights, according to the Jamaat 
women that Jamal interviews, should enhance, not repress Islamic values. She quotes 
from an interview of a woman activist of the Jamaat e Islami (JI) who explains that while 
Jamaat women are modern, they are not westernised.
32
 
Similarly, Humeira Iqtidar’s (2008) work on women in the Jamaat e Islami (JI) 
and Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD),
33
 also questions the notion that women are pressurised or 
coerced to conform to piety movements or join Islamist parties.
34
 Her theoretical 
perspective relies on scholarship that challenges the modernisation framework and which 
looks to include religion as a legitimate category of political analysis. She argues that the 
religious agency and belief of women activists of right wing political parties in Pakistan, 
is not blind but rather, is historically and culturally grounded and therefore, substantive. 
Iqtidar (2008) goes further than Jamal on two points which argue that women’s 
agency can be mediated by religious belief and does not have to be consciously feminist. 
Her research finds that resistance to male domination may be incidental rather than 
purposeful in the activism of these right wing women. Secondly, her analysis of these 
religious political parties suggests that by rejecting or failing at secular careers, women 
who join these Islamist parties find independent avenues which afford these women, 
liberation. She also quotes scholarship that suggests that the status of women in post-
revolutionary Iran or indeed, under any Islamised regimes may have carried “certain 
advantages” and in any case, should not be analysed through any “de-contextualized 
categories”.
35
 Further, Iqtidar contends that by bringing religious belief into the public 




Where Jamal (2005) and Iqtidar (2008) stop short in their attribution of agency to 
women activists of Islamist parties, is when they do not acknowledge the purpose of the 
agency and the conservative ends towards which it is used. The few examples that Jamal 
does quote in terms of Jamaat women emulating secular feminist strategies and 
methodology of politicking, may be countered by the many instances where they also 
support anti-women legislation and policies. 
Both scholars rely on Saba Mahmood’s challenge to feminist theory which 
assumes that agency must be substantive and informed by a feminist consciousness.
37
 
Instead, Mahmood argues that in fact, piety movements prove that agency can be 
attributed even to passive, docile non-action and preservation of the status quo and that 
feminist politics is not a natural desire. Humeira Iqtidar concludes through her dialogue 
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with a woman member of Jamaat ud Dawa, that Islamist parties can be oppressive for 
some but liberating sanctuaries for others.
38
 The political experience in the Pakistani 
context, however, has shown that faith based agency of women in religious parties is not 
just often used for non-feminist ends but increasingly to actively support a patriarchal 
Islamic agenda.  
Three different examples help to put this contention into context.
39
 The first is an 
observation on the role and performance of right wing women representatives and the 
political positions they took on women’s issues in Parliament between 2002 and 2008. 
Apart from the overall conservative and anti-women legislation and policies promoted in 
the NWFP discussed above, within the national Parliament too there were clear 
ideological divides on legislation regarding women’s rights. When the opposition party, 
the PPP, proposed a bill on domestic violence, it was resisted by several male members 
from the ruling party (PML-Q) as well as the religious party, MMA. This led to a heated 
debate and women Parliamentarians staged a protest in the Assembly when the (male) 
Parliamentary secretary opposed the bill on the grounds that a Muslim husband had the 
right to admonish and even beat his wife if she was disobedient.  
In an impressive move of going against the party line, Samia R. Qazi, member of 
Parliament representing the religious party, the MMA (daughter of the amir of the JI, 
Qazi Hussein Ahmed), defended the domestic violence bill by taking a stand against the 
Parliamentary secretary’s interpretation of the Quranic verse. Admittedly, Samia Qazi’s 
intervention was in support of protecting women from gratuitous marital violence as 
interpreted by male readings of religious verses. At the same time, her intervention record 
shows that she supported the larger understanding that a woman of a ‘certain character’ 
and attitude may warrant light beatings but this should not become an excuse for men to 
use wives as punching bags.
40
 Such stances can be read as proof of agency of Islamist 
women but not only is this merely non-feminist but indeed, actively upholds a patriarchal 
coercive social order or contract with reference to ‘appropriate’ matrimonial obedience or 
conduct.  
The second exemplar with regard to Islamist women’s agency is in connection 
with the Jamia Hafsa incident in 2007 which was simply a precursor of the potential of 
the personal religious agency of women being converted in to political activism. The 
Jamia Hafsa women students belonged to a religious school or madrassa part of the Lal 
Masjid mosque in the capital city of Islamabad. They illegally occupied the premises 
adjoining the mosque land in protest against the government’s threat to demolish and 
reclaim it as a suspected hotbed for terrorist indoctrination. The Jamia Hafsa women 
students conducted a vigilante puritanical drive against ‘unislamic’ practices, such as the 
sale of music and by demanding that video shops shut down. They also kidnapped a 
woman from the neighbourhood suspected of running a prostitution business and only let 
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her go once she ‘repented’. Eventually, a few months later, the seminary was stormed by 
state troops which led to the death of many in the mosque and while the government 
denies any women students were killed in the shoot-out, there has been no transparent 
inquiry or report on the action. 
Women’s rights and human rights groups in Pakistan protested against the 
vigilantism of the Jamia Hafsa women students. At the same time, they also disputed the 
need for such disproportionate use of state force when troops launched a military 
operation (Operation Silence, 10
th
 July, 2006) against the mosque where the clerics and 
students were lodged, armed and refused to vacate the state property. The visuals of these 
women students (which are also available on Youtube) show hundreds of women 
completely clad in black veils and holding bamboo sticks. However, other Islamist parties, 
including their women activists, have remained silent on this issue. They do not publicly 
support nor condemn such action nor do they express solidarity with the women of Jamia 
Hafsa as a political statement. The only exception was the Jamaat e Islami women’s wing 
which held a press conference in July 2008, one year after the incident and after losing 
the national elections in February 2008. Former MNA (Member of National 
Assembly/Parliament) and representative of the JI, Saima Qazi, accused the former 
government (which included her!) as desecrating “Islamic principles such as burqa, veil 
and beard”
41
 with reference to the Jamia Hafsa incident. She also demanded that an 
Inquiry on the incident should be held but made no comment as to the actions of the JH 
women themselves or to their politics or action.   
A third example of the kind of agency demonstrated by women in relation to 
gendered religious identities is more complex. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 
Nov. 2008, the pressure on the Pakistani government led to a crackdown for hunting 
suspects believed to be members of Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD). This organisation is 
considered to be a front or cover for the banned extremist religious group, Lashkar e 
Tayabba (LeT). In defence of the Jamaat ud Dawa, some 200 Hindu minority women in 
Sindh came out to protest against this state action in support of this banned terrorist 
organisation.
42
 They claimed that JuD supported their poor community and gave them 
protection and services. Importantly, these women crossed gender and religious 
boundaries to support those who would ordinarily be their religious antagonists. I submit, 
the progressive Women’s Action Forum
43
 has difficulty mobilising 200 Muslim women 
to protest on cases of rape or violence, leave alone reaching to minority communities to 
support their causes. This, despite the fact, that many non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have been involved in service delivery and developing relationships with the 
communities for some 30 years now. 
The contention is then, that religious affiliation and empowerment from within the 
religious discourse may be completely independent of delivering or receiving human 
rights and development (quite different from philanthropy). Thus, the system of 
patronage as used by religious organisations extends itself out to minority communities 
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(too) while simultaneously making them targets of legal and social discrimination as part 
of their religious ethos. Either way, the hegemonistic intent of these faith-based 
organisations, which are often linked to religious political parties, is clearly political 
rather than merely charitable. Both ways, such a strategy can work its faith based politics 
or agency, to liberate and oppress at the same time.
44




The central anguish of the revivalists, particularly in the Islamophobic 
environments of western countries in the post 9/11 era, is over how Muslim countries 
have adopted wholesale modernist agendas of western governments and ideologies of 
western feminisms. This is not a new accusation, since conservatives and Islamists 
including Gen. Zia ul Haq himself, repeatedly attempted to de-legitimise women activists 
who challenged the state for equal rights, as being ‘westernised’. Yet, 30 years later when 
the feminists of the second wave
45
 have not only entrenched their politics and gathered 
support at grassroots levels, it’s a misplaced indictment that is rarely officially issued 
from Islamists in Pakistan, as it is from diasporic contexts.
46
 Islamophobia has becomes 
pivotal in the consciences of diasporic Muslims, it seems, when analysing secular 
resistance in Muslim countries. Diasporic analysis also tends to fetishize and romanticise 
Islamist movements, particularly its women activists.  
The contradiction in placing premium on the “authentic believing” Muslim 
woman as opposed to the westernised secular Muslim woman is clear in two perspectives 
on this issue. On the one hand, Amina Jamal’s analysis attempts to highlight that in fact, 
the values, goals and efforts of Jamaat e Islami women are located in a modernist 
discourse and not some traditionalist one.
47
 On the other hand, Humeira Iqtidar’s work 
suggests that modernity is a construct that must be rejected and she suggests that by 
redefining agency and liberation, we can accept that these can be defined in religious 
terms, as well as non-feminist, respectively.
48
 According to both views, whether we 
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accept or reject modernity as defined by the secularists’ worldview, this allows an 
acknowledgement of Islamist women’s agency as historically more relevant and 
culturally grounded. 
However, both sets of analyses belong to what I term, political nunneries.
49
 These 
are ethnographies that attribute agency as part of an anthropological effort to (re) 
construct an ideological framework for a political alternative to liberal notions of secular 
modernity. In the process, they stop short of contextualizing the political articulations of 
the agency that they recognise or ascribe to Islamist women that they study. In other 
words, when this agency converts into political articulation, there is no discussion of the 
implications, outcome or effects of such agency which has been, in the experience of 
Pakistan, both vociferously anti-women at worst, or silent and hence complicit, at best. 
Religious political parties claim to be true protectors of women as long as women 
adhere to their domestic domain, since the family is considered to be the locus of 
women’s security. In a monograph that records the actions and stances of the MMA 
between 2003 and 2005, Brohi lists a series of cases of violence against women in the 
NWFP during the leadership of the MMA government.
50
 She notes the repeated silence 
on these cases including violent rapes, forced marriages and honour killings against 
which MMA claims to be vehemently opposed. Even beyond the NWFP, on the 
publicised case of the jirga
51
 ordered rape of Mukhtara Mai, which was condemned by 
activists across the ideological divide, women members of the MMA, at a seminar in 
Lahore, demanded a ban on NGOs whom they held responsible for “harming the country 
by raising the Mukhtara Mai issue”.
52
 Brohi notes, “The MMA’s strategy for preventing 
violence against women such as rape, gang rape and harassment is to reduce to minimum 
if not eliminate, their interaction with men”.
53
 
Against this backdrop then, it is difficult to understand how these religious 
political parties can be understood to be potential reformists and ideologically liberating 
spaces, rather than politically radical and indeed, conservative to the point of being 
fascistic, as in the above examples.  
   
Some Proposals of Reconciliation 
The temptation to conflate cultural purity with Islam as found in the new 
revivalist scholarship poses a practical challenge for the women’s movement in Pakistan.  
The approach of such a self-acclaimed “reconstructive project”
54
 suggests that “[Since] 
customary practice is very often the locus of offending norms, particularly in the area of 
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forced marriages in Pakistan, the implantation of Islamic legality in this sphere is a 
greater bulwark against such practices in that an alternate social order is proposed….”
55
   
This project overlaps with the Islamic feminist one that attempts to separate 
patriarchal cultural practices from ‘pure’ religion. It is also the locale where secular 
feminists have struggled the most in their realisation that women’s sexuality is the site 
where both culture and religion collude to control and measure society’s moral order. 
Thus the latter’s concern is not so much on the interpretation of the law but over the fact 
that patriarchal culture and/or religion will dominate any translation of the social order. 
These feminists are not looking for bulwarks, rather they are looking to uproot and 
transform gender relations to ensure that women’s choices are neither divinely legally 
ordained nor sanctioned by a patriarchal culture. 
  Conventional Islamic punishment, such as stoning to death which is practised in 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, is not executed in Pakistan. Yet the informal, parallel 
legal structures institutionalise extra judicial practices based on the notion of retributive 
justice as culturally authentic and Islamically sanctioned. If the state continues to embed 
religious legality so as to reclaim and excavate an imagined ‘pure’ Islamic culture, then 
necessarily some historical moments within patriarchal culture and religion will overlap 
and logically, will condone stoning and honour killings.  
When a woman minister for social welfare, Zille Huma, was shot at a public event 
by an ‘extremist’ for not adequately veiling herself in 2007, does that fall under cultural 
norms or religious sanction? Flogging is widely understood as a prescribed religious 
punishment subject to circumstances, judicial process and interpretation. In cases of 
adultery, blasphemy, wilful marriages and denying women their property rights by 
marrying them off to the holy book, cultural sanctions are often derived from or collude 
with existing religious laws. Thus until the law was amended in 2006, the Zina law 
became a tool of controlling women’s choice in marriage and her mobility, not so much 
about adultery. Even after the amendment, the basic premise of this law centres on the 
monitoring of women’s sexuality as a threat to social order. Blasphemy, if proven, is 
punishable by death but often, enraged Muslims take this law into their hands and use it 
as a moral justification to attack and even kill (usually) other Muslims. In most cases, the 
issue has nothing to do with blaspheming but is used to settle personal scores. Women’s 
marital choice is subject to permission from her wali or guardian. At best, some women 
legislators have attempted to make the state the wali rather than a woman’s male relative, 
which has been resisted by the right wing women representatives. In either case, the 
concept of a wali for women and minors remains a discriminatory requirement. The 
cultural practice of marrying a woman to the holy book (Quran) to deny her property 
rights was amended in 2005 under the Blasphemy law, as this crime is interpreted as an 
insult to the holy book not as a contravention of a woman’s basic right. Retributive 
justice, as meted out in cases of murder under the Qisas and Diyat
56
 law, sustain cultural 
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norms of bartering compensation in return for a life taken, such as in (illegal) cultural 
practices like honour killings.
57
 
Thus, some patriarchal cultural practices do not contravene the broader Islamic 
moral and social order, including attributing women lesser inheritance or minorities lesser 
status as citizens. The notion that since women are guaranteed (lesser) inheritance rights 
in Islam, so at least these cannot be (theoretically) resisted or denied due to any 
competing cultural practices, is a defeatist one. If one is to only obtain theoretical rights, 
then they may as well be equal, as prescribed by universal civil code not religious 
prescription. Religion is not a logic that is going to be accepted as a piece of legislation 
particularly if it challenges patriarchal norms. This piecemeal logic is also applied in 
other cases where ‘progressive’ interpretations of religion are appreciated as successful 
implantations of Islamic ethos. These always stop short of being equal for women with 
the understanding that if such an attempt would be made, such laws would be 
unsuccessful since they do not accommodate the expectations of normative religion nor 
the cultural environment as determined by patriarchy.    
However, such arguments are more problematic when cultural practice and 
religious ethos do contravene each other. Then which will supersede, cultural authenticity 
or Islam?  It is very much like the question: Which came before, the chicken or the egg? 
The argument that there is significant debate within Islamic tradition and ijtehad 
(independent reasoning) and ijma (consensus) is the derivative method of legislating a 
religious law, is simply an attempt to justify another way of bringing (western) rationality 
and commonsense into the religious discourse. Gen. Musharraf’s liberal intervention 
which led him to issue a reference against the proposed Hisbah Bill of the religious right 
government in NWFP, allowed the Supreme Court to strike down the bill. That is how 
the Council of Islamic Ideology operates and courts in Pakistan too. By and large, they 
tend to respond to the political mood and leadership of the period.  
Every time the Council makes a humanistic, progressive or modernist 
interpretation (which coincides with the universalist human rights discourse) of an 
Islamic law, this is hailed as proof of the progressive spirit of Islam. In other words, the 
standard against which progress is measured in Muslim countries is often when women’s 
Islamic rights are compared favourably against western or universal codes. Therefore, 
despite prescribed lesser status with regard to property, polygamy, law on adultery, child 
custody, evidence, blood money and so on, these Quranic prescriptions are always 
justified as requiring ‘progressive’ interpretation or rendered inapplicable if ‘taken out of 
context’ and thereby needing historical textual supporting evidence. This process is 
reductive rather than cumulative. 
To presume that interpretations can be made in vacuum under some suspended 
historical period and under the pretence that, we are no longer defined by modernist 
discourse, is an unrealistic political expectation. Activism demands strategic alliances, as 
well as political positioning. When the opportunity came up to reform the Zina Ordinance 
in 2006 during Gen. Musharraf’s government, women activists were not about to get 
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caught up in a debate that had been circulating for 27 years. Eventually, the adultery laws 
were not repealed as the liberal women’s movement had demanded but amended instead. 
The right wing women, who clearly stood against the original Zina Ordinance from the 
1980s, formally opposed the call for repeal or amending the law for the first time in 25 
years. They had shifted from their earlier academic position that the law was interpreted 
incorrectly. They had also rejected the political imperative behind such a law passed by 
Gen. Zia ul Haq. Some 25 years later, the right wing women shifted their strategic 
position on the law and followed the male dictate which insisted that any change in this 
law would convert Pakistan into a “free sex zone”.
58
This was an absolute rejection of 
modernising a discriminatory law which targeted women and which compounded rape 
with adultery. This can be taken as evidence of the success of the agency of right wing 
women which is non-feminist, non-modernist but of course, is clearly not just political 
but very radical.  
Certainly agency is not the monopoly of the vanguard and is arguably, even better 
organised and used by the rearguard too. However, there is a critical blindness within 
these analyses which disregard how this agency is converted into political articulation 
and its impact. The suggestion that this agency helps women in their personal politics is 
fine and coincides with the Islamic feminists’ stance but this cannot stop here. When this 
agency spills into an organised, anti-women, anti-minorities political agenda, then the 
responsibility for the consequences of the exercise of such agency must also be equally 
appreciated. 
The pragmatic proposal of a coalition of Islamic, secular and other feminisms in 
the form of ‘hybrid feminisms’
59
 as submitted by Huma Ahmed-Ghosh is less 
problematic in theory but strategically has proven to be unwise in the Pakistani 
experience. The concept of ‘patriarchy trading’ which allows women some agency by 
accepting patriarchy is a dormant and tentative precipice to put women on. Repeatedly, 
the experience of feminist alliances has shown that right wing politics manages to 
subsume and co-opt not just the tactics, vocabulary and strategies of feminism but even 
manages to subvert these for the most patriarchal ends. At first, Islamic feminists re-
thought the concept of the veil as more polysemic than the oriental and western feminist 
understanding of it. Now there is rethinking of polygamy, which is increasingly 
becoming a bargain that some (first wives) negotiate in order to gain domestic relief 
when second wives take over their duties. Certainly there are debates and contestations 
within the religious political discourse, particularly between male and female ideologues 
on the issue and place of women’s rights. However, such competitive struggles also tend 
to pit the perceived ‘good Muslim woman’ who adheres to the more literal, conservative 
visions of the party against the challenging ‘bad Muslim woman’. The hierarchies of 
these religious parties are severe and women cannot head them nor integrate into the 
mainstream decision-making process. Thus their intellectual agency is unlikely to 
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contribute towards party policy unless they challenge the structures and roles for women 
members internally.   
If rights are not informed or premised on the basis of universal rights, then these 
will be dependent on the limiting reformist agenda of patriarchal impulses within culture 
and Islam, as described above. If we start accepting non-feminist agendas and lack of 
active resistance to male domination as acceptable agency by women activists of 
religious parties, then what hope is there of even challenging the patriarchal elements 
within religious discourse? This position of the revivalists defeats the activism of both 
Islamic and secular feminists alike. 
It is not just a political aversion that impedes liberal and Islamist women from 
coming together on women’s issues. Rather, the discourse of women’s rights has become 
a competitive one, whereby most contestants on the ideological spectrum attempt to 
appropriate the woman question as the marker or sign-post of their claim to political 
relevance. At least, the feminist agenda has been successful in making women’s rights 
central to the debate but whether this is helping the realisation or furtherance of their 
rights is questionable. 
When questioned on how the Zina laws should be amended, revivalist faculty 
members at the prestigious Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in 
Pakistan insisted that all reformative debate must be posited within Islamic history, texts 
and cultural relevance.
60
 They were of the view that the current amendment is untenable 
because it was done by a secular rationale. Such arguments guarantee postponement of 
resolution on any contentious issue, from equal rights in family and property laws, to 
Qisas and Diyat worth of a woman, with no assurance that in the ultimate analysis these 
will be decided in favour of equal rights.  
Jamal suggests we avoid the “re-inscribing [of] a simple framework of 
universalism-versus-cultural particularity and instead attempt to understand [Jamaat 
women’s] religious agency in their own terms as an unfolding universality…of the 
modern”.
61
 This is consistent with the unwillingness of revivalist scholars to comment on 
the political support and silence that Islamist women observe, when violations of 
women’s rights take place and if victims are perceived to have transgressed prescribed 
modes of acceptable Islamic behaviour. The political record does not support the fact that 
Jamaat women prioritise women’s rights inspite of the transgression. Thus, privatisation 
of women’s empowerment, modernist or not, is a useful proposition, except it does not 
corroborate with the politically articulated record of religious political parties. In fact, 
precisely because it is “on their own terms”, the agency of Islamic activist women 
contradicts and restricts other women’s empowerment if its expression does not fit the 
religiously prescribed mould.  
There is also no mention nor supporting evidence in the research by Jamal or 
Iqtidar of whether these women challenge structural patriarchy beyond attitudinal 
defiance within the religious discourse. While they may personally defy male wishes and 
question decisions, their political activism on the contrary, has only demonstrated in the 
Pakistani context, a resistance to women’s independent legal or public status thus far. 
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 An example of such revivalist scholarship and debate particularly emerging from  LUMS can be found at 
http://www.baytunur.blogspot.com/  
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 Jamal, 2009, above cited, pg. 18. 
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The political performances and activism of women of religious parties in Pakistan 
in the last decade is contrary to the hope invested in a faith based progress on women’s 
rights. If, as revivalists wish, docility and limited mobility in male-dominated religious 
outfits qualify as viable acts of women’s rights, then perhaps we can claim that women’s 
potential for progress is high in Pakistan. However, it is not possible to measure such 
progress without devising a new set of indicators and indices. Meanwhile, according to 
any commonsensical
62
 indicators, there is no reason for such optimism and hope. 
Increased cases of stoning of women, floggings and beheadings, as well as a back-lash in 
cities where women are increasingly harassed by vigilante groups of men in the 
universities and streets demanding women cover themselves or remain indoors, are not 
signs of progress, presumably, by any definition. 
So far, stoning and flogging is only known to take place in Taliban territory (with 
sporadic incidents spilling over into other areas) and is committed by their militants. 
However, the backlash in other parts of the country of harassment and violence to prevent 
women from being in public spaces or exercising choice is loosely being termed as 
‘Talibanization’. Talibanization is simply the colloquialism that is being used to refer to 
the growth of intolerance advocated in the name of religion and which is attempting to 
violently prevent women’s mobility and education, as well as targeting shrines or other 
perceived ‘unislamic’ practices such as shaving beards or listening to music. This policy 
emerges not from the state nor is it just advocated by the Taliban media but in fact, is part 
of and supported by the discourse of mainstream religio-political parties, as well as non-
institutional piety movements. They reject the Taliban ethos as extreme and ‘unislamic’ 
but imbibe and promote many of the same principles packaged in a less extreme or 
dramatic version. Such programmes to promote Islamic etiquette are also found in upper 
class clubs and theocratic societies and public and private universities. Religious 
discourse has subsumed all other forms of theory, philosophy and currency. 
Regardless of the nature of leadership, whether it was a liberal General Musharraf 
or the earlier despotic Gen. Zia ul Haq, women have served as the ideological identity 
markers of the liberal or regressive potential of a regime. In political reality, they 
continue to lose the larger struggle for equal rights. Now, a defeatist academic proposal 
that attempts to seam together secularism with Islam, as a culturally viable project, relies 
on the agency demonstrated by the religio-political parties. This challenges the minimum 
expectation that equal rights for women and minorities should be a non-negotiable 
determinant of political activism and citizenry. In the process, feminist politics is a price 
such a project is willing to sacrifice if it does not fit the cultural, spiritual or political 
requirements of an increasingly conservative and anti women agenda of the religio-
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 I refer here to Nivedita Menon’s discussion on the particular and the universal. She problematises the 
notion of what she calls ‘the myth of free will’ and calls for the need of a ‘radical politics’ which are “long 
term struggles to reclaim meaning at the level of common sense…to challenge local structures of 
power…the family and other hegemonising institutions”. She also points out the limitations of the law in 
dealing with ‘free will’ and its ‘unfreedom’ though maintains that in democratic politics the notion of free 
will should be preserved for the right to proselytise and convert. Nivedita Menon, ‘Recovering Subversion; 
Feminist Politics Beyond the Law’, Permanent Black, 2004, India, pg 216. 
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